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A Model of Overconfidence
*
 
People use information about their ability to choose tasks. If more challenging tasks provide 
more accurate information about ability, people who care about and who are risk averse over 
their perception of their own ability will choose tasks that are not sufficiently challenging. 
Overestimation of ability raises utility by deluding people into believing that they are more 
able than they are in fact. Moderate overestimation of ability and overestimation of the 
precision of initial information leads people to choose tasks that raise expected output, 
however extreme overconfidence leads people to undertake tasks that are excessively 
challenging. Consistent with our results, psychologists have found that moderate 
overconfidence is both pervasive and advantageous and that people maintain such beliefs by 
underweighting new information about their ability. 
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A Model of Overconfidence 
 
“The over-weening conceit which the greater part of men have of their own abilities, is 
an ancient evil remarked by the philosophers and moralists of all ages (page 120).” 
 
“Without regarding the danger, however, young volunteers never enlist so readily as at 
the beginning of a new war; and though they have scarce any chance of preferment, they 
figure to themselves, in their youthful fancies, a thousand occasions of acquiring honour 
and distinction which never occur (page 122).” 
 
--Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations. 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
Observers have noted that people tend to approach their endeavors with excessive 
confidence
1. The literature in psychology, which is discussed in the next section, points 
to two aspects of overconfidence. First, while the fate of Smith’s military volunteers 
vividly illustrates the costs of extreme overconfidence, researchers have consistently 
found that moderate overestimation of ability is advantageous relative to a realistic 
assessment. Second, in updating their beliefs, people disregard much of the information 
that could be inferred from the outcomes of their actions. 
This paper develops a simple, single-period, rational model in which it is optimal 
to be overconfident and to down weight new information about ability. We assume that 
people care about their beliefs about their ability and are risk averse in them. As 
discussed below, both assumptions are consistent with research in psychology. In our 
model people choose whether to undertake a challenging task, the realization of which 
depends on their ability, or to decline it in favor of a sure-thing, with a fixed payoff that 
                                                 
1 DeBondt and Thaler (1995, p. 389) state, “Perhaps the most robust finding in the 
psychology of judgement is that people are overconfident.”   2
does not depend on ability. This structure captures the general phenomenon that ability 
matters more in more challenging tasks, so that more challenging tasks provide more 
accurate information about ability (at least locally). The choice of tasks depends on the 
person’s priors over his ability. Risk aversion over ability leads people to limit their 
information about their ability. Because choosing the sure-thing provides less 
information, people choose the sure-thing too often. 
We study how expected utility changes as the mean of a person’s priors over his 
ability or his perception of the precision of his priors increases. We show that increasing 
the mean of a person’s priors over his ability raises his expected utility when the mean is 
below, equal to, or even slightly above his actual ability. In this sense, it is advantageous 
to initially overestimate ability, which is how we conceptualize overconfidence. It is 
trivial to show that higher priors raise a person’s utility by deluding him into believing 
that he is more able than he is in truth. More significantly, priors affect the person’s task 
choice. We show that moderately overestimating ability leads the person to undertake the 
challenging task more often, yielding higher expected output and a higher expected 
utility (even net of the utility from being deluded about his ability). Intuitively, if 
individuals tend to avoid the challenging task and, if the mean of the priors are beneath 
the true ability or exceed it only slightly, an increase in the mean of the priors will lead 
the person to undertake the challenging task, increasing expected output. Beyond some 
point, further increases in the mean of the priors make the individual take the challenging 
task even when its expected output is low, lowering expected output. 
We also show that an individual who underestimates the variance of his priors is 
more willing to choose the challenging task, which raises expected output and utility   3
given the tendency to take the sure-thing. Consistent with research in psychology, 
overestimating the precision of the initial signal leads the individual to underweight new 
information. 
Our model identifies conditions under which a rational, time-consistent individual 
acting in isolation prefers to overestimate both his ability and the precision of his 
estimate of his ability. A number of other papers have developed explanations for (the 
first form of) overconfidence under some, but not all, of these assumptions. One class of 
models shows that overconfidence can evolve by increasing survival probabilities, even 
though it lowers individual utility. De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1991) 
show that overconfident investors, by taking more risky positions with higher returns, 
may come to dominate asset markets. Waldman (1994) shows that systematic errors, 
including overconfidence, may be evolutionarily stable. Here overconfidence is second 
best. Bernardo and Welch (1999) show that overconfidence, while individually harmful, 
may benefit a population in which herding generates inefficient information aggregation. 
Again, overconfidence lowers individual utility in these models. Other models generate 
benefits to overconfidence in the presence of time-inconsistency (Benabou and Tirole 
1999a, also see Jovanovic and Stolyarov 1999), or in a game theoretic context (Kyle and 
Wang 1997; Gervais and Goldstein 2004). Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996) show that a 
case-based decision maker whose initial aspiration level is high and who occasionally 
raises his aspiration to exceed his best average performance will converge asymptotically 
to the expected-utility maximizing decision. Here, overconfident behavior vanishes 
asymptotically. Like the present paper, Koszegi (2000a,b) considers a Bayesian expected 
utility maximizers, who cares about his beliefs over ability. Koszegi (2000a) focuses on   4
information manipulation. We consider the beliefs that maximize utility, showing that 
moderately overconfident beliefs maximize expected utility. 
Our results relate to research in the psychology. This literature is discussed in the 
next section. Section III develops the model. Section IV discusses possible extensions 
and robustness. Section V concludes and provides a interpretation of how overconfidence 
might evolve. 
II.  Relationship to Literature in Psychology 
Research in psychology provides strong evidence of both aspects of 
overconfidence - overestimating ability and overestimating the accuracy of one’s 
knowledge. It indicates that overconfidence is an important determinant of task choice 
and identifies advantages of overconfidence (see Oskamp 1965; Alpert and Raiffa 1982; 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, Phillips 1982; and Taylor and Brown 1988; Braumeister (1998) 
covers many of these topics).
2 
Research on self-efficacy in psychology indicates that perceived  self-efficacy is 
an important determinant of people’s choice of tasks (see Bandura 1977, 1986, 1997).
3 
Bandura (1986) writes, “People tend to avoid tasks and situations they believe exceed 
their capabilities, but they undertake and perform assuredly activities they judge 
themselves capable of handling (p. 393).” Like Smith, Bandura notes that miss-
perceptions of self-efficacy are potentially costly, 
                                                 
2 Special issues of the Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology (Vol. 8, No. 3, Fall 
1989) and the Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin (Vol. 21, No. 12, December 
1995) investigate a variety of issues relating to overconfidence. 
3 Bandura (1986) defines “perceived self-efficacy” as “ people’s judgements of their 
capabilities to organize and execute courses of action required to attain designated types 
of performances (p. 391).”    5
Reasonably accurate appraisals of one’s own capabilities is, therefore, of 
considerable value in successful functioning. Large misjudgements of 
personal efficacy in either direction have consequences. People who 
grossly overestimate their capabilities undertake activities that are clearly 
beyond their reach. As a result they get themselves into considerable 
difficulties, undermine their credibility, and suffer needless failures…. 
People who underestimate their capabilities also bear costs, although, as 
already noted, these are more likely to take self-limiting rather than 
aversive forms. (p. 393-394). 
Bandura also argues for the benefits of overconfidence, stating, “The efficacy judgements 
that are the most functional are probably those that slightly exceed what one can do at 
any given time (p. 394).” 
Work on depression also emphasizes that estimated ability affects task choice. 
Beck (1967) identifies “ability, performance, intelligence, health, strength, personal 
attractiveness, popularity, or financial resources (p. 22)” as areas in which a depressed 
person might view himself as inadequate
4. Also emphasizing that depression affects 
estimates of one’s ability, Seligman (1975) says that “Depression is not generalized 
pessimism, but pessimism specific to the effects of one’s own skilled actions (p. 86).” 
Beck describes how depression affects choice of actions, “the patient seems drawn to 
activities that are the least demanding for him either in terms of the degree of 
responsibility or initiative required… (p. 27).” Seligman (1975) writes that “A belief in 
helplessness may produce apparent intellectual deficits in depressives indirectly, through 
a motivational impairment (p. 83).” There is some evidence for depressive realism – that 
nondepressed individuals are overconfident while the assessments of depressed 
individuals are more realistic (see Alloy and Abramson 1979, and surveys by Alloy and   6
Abramson 1987, Ruehlman, West, and Pasahow 1985, Dobson and Franche 1989, and 
Ackermann and DeRubeis 1991). Yet, greater realism on the part of depressed 
individuals does not seem to be beneficial; Alloy and Abramson (1979) conclude that 
depressed people are “sadder but wiser.” 
Taylor and Brown (1988) are among the foremost proponents of the hypothesis 
that overconfidence is both normal and adaptive
5. If optimal-overconfidence is 
anomalous from a rational choice perspective, psychologists have also noted the paradox. 
Taylor and Brown (1988), write, 
Decades of psychological wisdom have established contact with reality as 
a hallmark of mental health. In this view, the well-adjusted person is 
thought to engage in accurate reality testing whereas the individual whose 
vision is clouded by illusion is regarded as vulnerable to, if not already a 
victim of, mental illness…. We examine evidence that a set of interrelated 
positive illusions – namely, unrealistically positive self-evaluations, 
exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism – 
can serve a wide range of cognitive, affective, and social functions 
(p.193). 
Individuals maintain overconfidence in part by disregarding information about 
ability. In a survey, Shrauger (1975) states that, “Data on variables that involve the 
cognitive processing of information indicate quite uniformly that evaluative feedback 
which is inconsistent with one’s initial perceptions is not as readily assimilated as that 
which is consistent (p. 592).” Another survey by Shrauger and Schoeneman (1979) 
concludes that there is little evidence that people’s self-perceptions respond to feedback 
received by others in natural settings. Self-serving attributions may also lead people to 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Beck (1967) writes, “Low self-esteem is a characteristic feature of depression (p. 22).” 
Cuhna (1997) surveys this literature from an economic perspective and shows that 
depression is associated with lower educational attainment and wages.   7
attribute negative outcomes to external factors (see Miller and Ross 1975 and Zuckerman 
1979). 
Our model assumes that people care about their beliefs of their ability, and that 
low estimates of ability are particularly unpleasant (that utility is concave in perceived 
ability). In this context, people choose tasks with lower expected output in order to lower 
the probability of receiving negative information about their ability. The assumption that 
(in economic terms) people are risk averse in their beliefs over their ability is consistent 
with a line of research in psychology by Jonathon Brown and Keith Dutton. Brown and 
Dutton (1995) speculate, 
Failure hurts LSE [low self-esteem] people more than HSE [high self-
esteem] people. Cast in the language of an expectancy-value model of 
behavior this suggests that LSE people place a greater negative value on 
not attaining a goal than do HSE people. Their behavior in many 
situations may be guided by this fact. They may become more concerned 
with protecting the self from the pain of failure than risking success (p. 
720). 
Dutton and Brown (1997) show that failure on a task affects the emotions of low self 
esteem individuals more adversely than high self esteem individuals. 
This line of work, like the present one, relates this greater sensitivity to adverse 
outcomes among low self esteem individuals to information processing. Thus, Dutton and 
Brown [1997] argue that differences in information processing between low and high self 
esteem individuals may account for the different effects on emotion (utility) among low 
and high self-esteem individuals. In particular, they argue that the greater adverse effect 
of negative information on low self esteem individuals arises because high self esteem 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 See Colvin and Block (1994a, 1994b) for a critique, and Taylor and Brown (1994) for a 
response.   8
individuals disregard more adverse information than low self esteem individuals by 
making more self-serving attributions. We show that concavity in beliefs over ability 
generates an incentive for people to down weight new information, and that this incentive 
is particularly strong for people who are initially overconfident. One might view this 
aspect of our analysis as rigorously specifying conditions under which the information 
processing patterns they observe are optimal. 
Interestingly, research on self-handicapping indicate that low-self esteem 
individuals will make decisions that lower their probability of success in a task in order 
to reduce the negative information implied by failing (Tice 1991). While aware that self-
esteem and perceived self-efficacy may affect “utility” directly, much of the literature in 
psychology discusses overconfidence assuming that it affects “utility” only through task 
choice. Our model suggests that utility effects of overconfidence are important for 
overconfidence to be optimal
6. 
We speculate that risk aversion over beliefs about ability may have arisen from 
matching among mates. People care about their potential mate’s ability because it affects 
their families, but early in life, little information about the ability of potential mates is 
publicly available. Much information will come from potential mates, which may be 
partially manipulable, and which will largely depend on beliefs. To the extent that the 
gains from improving mate quality are greatest at the low end, the benefits from 
improving beliefs about ability, which will be communicated to mates, will be concave. 
                                                 
6 It would also be possible to obtain optimal overconfidence with higher order 
interactions between ability and task choice in the production function. Unfortunately, it 
is unclear a priori which way such interactions should enter and unlikely that they will be   9
This explanation implies that overconfidence will be most important at young ages, when 
mates are chosen and before information about ability becomes publicly available. 
III.  The Model 
This section develops a simple, single-period model to study the effects of priors 
on an individual’s decisions and outcomes. The benefits to a given course of action will 
depend on the person’s ability,  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ a . At the beginning of life, the individual has some 
priors over his ability. To ease the analysis, we assume that he believes that his ability is 
distributed according to a beta distribution with mean µ. The variance depends on the 
amount of prior information, given by n. The probability density of a is 
() ()
() ( ) () ()
() 1 1 1 1
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The individual chooses whether or not to undertake a risky task that can either be 
successful or unsuccessful. Ability increases the probability of success in the risky task. 
If the person performs the task, the person realizes high output, yH, with probability a and 
low output, yL, with probability 1-a.  (The case of beta-distributed priors and Bernoulli 
outcomes is particularly tractable, (see for instance, Feller [1968]). Another attractive 
case is that of normally distributed priors and outcomes. (A previous version of this 
                                                                                                                                                 
the same for all tasks, which would imply overconfidence in some areas and under-
confidence in others. 
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µ  and  β α + ≡ n , implying  n µ α =  and  () µ β − = 1 n .   10
paper, which is available on request, derived similar results in that case.) People 
encounter a variety of tasks, with varying outcomes. To account for this fact, we assume 





r = , in the task is randomly distributed with probability 
density,  () r f , which the person knows. Here we assume that the probability of success 
depends only on ability and not potential returns and that ability does not affect potential 
returns. This formulation captures the idea that different people will face different tasks, 
some of which will have higher returns and some of which have worse returns. A more 
general model might allow the returns to affect the probability and to allow people to 
choose the optimal task. 
If the person undertakes the task, its outcome provides information about his 
ability. Bayesian updating implies that the posteriors over a are also distributed according 

















µ  and  1 ' + = n n  if low output is realized. 
If the person decides not to perform the task, output is  0 y  for certain, where 
0 y yL < . If the person chooses not to perform the task, no new information about the 
distribution of his ability is revealed, so that  µ µ = '  and  n n = ' . 
The person’s utility is a Cobb-Douglas function of his consumption and the 
expectation of his posteriors over his ability ( ) ' ln ln 1 µ θ θ + − y . If the individual takes 
the risky action, based on his priors, he expects utility of   11
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If the individual does not take the risky action, he has utility of ( ) µ θ θ ln ln 1 0 + − y  for 
certain. 
Solution of the Model 
The solution to the individual’s problem involves the choice of a cut-off return 
* r . Given his priors, the individual expects his utility to be  
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Differentiating with respect to 
* r  to obtain the first order condition for the optimal 
* r  

























































It is possible to show that the term in brackets is positive, so  ( ) 0 ln
* > > L O y y r .
8 
The individual’s expected utility given his actual ability and his priors µ and n is  
[] () [] ()
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of the natural log function.   12
This expression differs from  [] n U E , µ  in that the probabilities of success and failure 
depend on the individual’s actual ability, rather than his expectation of it based on his 
priors. We assess the effect of the individuals priors on his utility using this expression, 
which conditions on the individual’s true ability. 
Effect of an Increase in Expected Ability 
This section considers the effect of overconfidence on task choice and utility 
(overall and separately from consumption and ability, which we refer to as “delusion”). 
In this model, overconfidence arises when the mean of a person’s priors over his ability 
exceed his actual ability (µ>a).
9 We analyze the effect of increasing confidence, as 
reflected by the mean of a person’s priors over his ability, µ, holding ability constant and 
show that increasing µ raises utility so long as the person is not too over confident (so 
long as µ is not too high relative to a). This fact, that utility is higher when µ exceeds a 
somewhat than when µ=a indicates that moderate overconfidence is optimal. 
An increase in  µ affects expected utility according to, 
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The first two terms reflect the effect of higher µ on the individual’s utility through his 
posteriors over his ability (delusion), and are unambiguously positive. The third term 
gives the effect of µ on the individual’s utility through his willingness to perform the 
challenging task. 
                                                 
9 Another worthwhile approach would be to specify a distribution of abilities and a 
distribution of priors and to view people as overconfident when the mean of the 
distribution of priors exceeds the mean of the distribution of abilities.   13
Turning to the third term, as shown in the appendix, an increase in µ lowers the 
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This expression gives the effect on utility (combining the consumption and delusion 
effect) of increases in the threshold for undertaking the risky task. The term in brackets is 
positive, so raising the threshold for choosing the challenging task, which makes the 
person less likely to undertake it, raises expected utility when the person initially 
overestimates his ability ( a > µ ) and lowers it when the person underestimates his ability 
( ) a < µ . Intuitively, a person who correctly estimates his ability (in the sense that µ=a) 
undertakes the risky task if it is the optimal action, whereas someone who under- (over-) 
estimates his ability takes the risky action too little (often). Increasing the threshold is 
neutral for people whose priors reflect their ability, and reduces (raises) utility for people 
who under- (over-) estimate their ability. 
Combining all terms, increasing the person’s priors over his ability increases his 
expected utility so long as his priors understate his ability or do not overstate it too 
greatly and so long as the effect of beliefs over ability are not too strong (θ  is not too 
high). When the priors overstate his ability too much, the cost from being overly 
ambitious exceeds the direct utility gain from believing his ability is high, which is the 
case of Smith’s soldiers. This result can be shown by calculating the change in utility   14









, it is possible 
to show that 


















































a n a n U E 1









The first term is positive, while the second is negative. Thus, so long as θ is not too high 
(so that the person does not benefit too much from delusion), the combined expression 
will be negative. Also, the cost of overestimating ability is to get the low consumption 
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f , increases) the cost from greatly 
overestimating ability increases. 
Increasing the mean of the individual’s priors also raises his expected utility from 
consumption. The individual’s expected utility from consumption is, 
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The term in brackets is positive, so when  a = µ , an increase in 
* r , as would arise if µ 
were reduced, lowers expected utility from consumption. Only when  a >> µ , do 
increases in µ reduce utility from consumption. Intuitively, in order to avoid risk from 
learning about his ability, the agent undertakes the challenging task only when its   15
expected payoff is very high. Slight overestimation of ability offsets his conservativism 
in undertaking the task and raises his expected utility and expected utility from 
consumption. When the individual overestimates his ability substantially, he undertakes 
the task when its expected return is too low. Further increases in his ability lead him to 
undertake the task too frequently and reduce his expected consumption utility. 
Effect of an Increase in the Precision of Priors 
This section considers the effect of increasing the precision of the individual’s 
priors, holding the mean of the priors constant. Formally, we consider the effect of 
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When the individual undertakes the task, an increase in n leads the person to place more 
weight on his priors and less weight on the information conveyed by the outcome of the 
task. Underweighting new information raises utility from ability when the low outcome is 
realized, but lowers it when the high outcome is realized. Because the individual is risk 
averse to new information about his ability, the decrease in utility when the low state is 
realized exceeds the increase when the high state is realized when  a = µ , so the 
individual benefits from downweighting new information when  a = µ .  
Only when the priors are sufficiently low relative to ability does increasing n 





− < µ  the probability that an unbiased signal raises   16
beliefs is sufficiently high to exceed the benefits from increased exposure to risk. 
Increasing n leads the person to reduce 
* r and undertake the task more frequently. When 
a = µ , changes in r
* are neutral in terms of utility but, as above, they raise consumption 
utility. Thus, the person benefits from believing that his priors are more precise, in the 
sense of higher n when the mean of his priors equal his true ability. 
IV.  Extensions and Robustness 
This section considers two alternative specifications. First, we consider our 
assumption of risk aversion in beliefs over ability. This assumption plays an important 
role in our results. If beliefs over ability do not directly enter the utility function then 
deviations of expected ability (the mean of priors) from actual ability in either direction 
will worsen task decisions and lower expected consumption and utility. If ability directly 
enters the utility function, but linearly, increases in expected ability will raise utility 
because of delusion, but reduce consumption. In this case, there is a tradeoff between 
ability utility and consumption utility, which can generate an interior optimal level of 
overconfidence. Thus, the implication that overconfidence can raise consumption utility 
depends in risk aversion in posteriors over ability, but the implication that 
overconfidence can be optimal only depends on beliefs directly affecting utility. 
It is also worth considering an extension to a multi-period model. In the single-
period model discussed so far, a person who overestimates the precision of his priors 
does experience a cost in terms of consumption. A person who overestimates the 
precision of his priors updates his priors more slowly. In a multi-period setting, this 
slower updating adds a cost in terms of worse task choices and lower consumption. In a 
multi-period setting, while overestimating the precision of priors can be helpful in   17
inducing the person to undertake the risky task more frequently, there is an additional 
cost to overestimating the precision of priors. 
V.  Conclusions and the Evolution of Overconfidence 
Psychologists have found that people are overconfident in their endeavors. 
Extreme overconfidence and under-confidence imposes considerable costs, but moderate 
overconfidence appears to be both pervasive and advantageous. Individuals maintain 
overconfident beliefs in part by biases in information processing – underweighting new 
information about their ability, especially when it is negative. We have shown that people 
who care about and are risk averse over their beliefs about their ability and who choose 
tasks based on their information derive benefits from being overconfident. Specifically, 
expected output is higher for individuals who moderately overestimate their ability. 
Expected output is also higher for people who overestimate the precision of their initial 
information, which implies an underweighting of new information. 
If moderate overconfidence raises expected output and expected utility, it is 
natural to consider how it might be perpetuated and spread in the population. Although 
we are not aware of studies that study the development and transmission of 
overconfidence, researchers have argued that childhood experiences are important 
determinants of self esteem (Dutton and Brown [1997]). It is reasonable to expect that 
individuals with higher utility and output would tend to have more children, because they 
have higher fitness and greater ability to support offspring and because they are more 
attractive to mates. If the information processing strategies that generate overconfidence 
are transmitted by parents to their children (perhaps in part genetically, as with 
depression, an extreme form of under-confidence), we would expect the population to   18
evolve so that the average member of the population will be overconfident. Alternatively, 
children may acquire these information processing strategies – filtering negative 
information and dwelling on positive information – by emulating successful individuals 
in the preceding generation. Indeed, considerable attention (including work on self-help) 
has been devoted to ways of improving self esteem among children and adults. For all 
these reasons, we expect the population to evolve toward overconfidence.   19
Appendix – Proof 
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To sign the expression in brackets, we use a first order Taylor expansion of the logarithm 
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